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uncertain, while risk aversion makes investors wait 
until they can be sure of the profitability of new 
investments. This causes significant delays before a 
new power plant becomes available, which in turn can 
cause so-called ‘boom-and-bust’ cycles: when periods 
of high-reserve margins and consequent low 
electricity prices that do not encourage new 
investments (due to subsequent progressive load 
increase and the decommissioning of old power 
plants) alternate with periods of low-reserve margins 
(and thus low security of supply) and consequent high 
electricity prices, this can lead to a new wave of 
investments. 
To tackle these problems, regulatory authorities in 
several electricity markets worldwide, with the 
approval of governments, defined and/or implemented 
specific intruments, such as tendering procedures for 
new capacity, capacity payments, capacity 
markets/obligations and call options. We recommend 
the implementation of such instruments to push 
investors to pursue the ‘optimal’ development of the 
generation set and to avoid capacity ‘bust’ situations. 
However, we also recommend relying on only those 
‘market-based’ mechanisms capable of finding the 
most efficient solution through competitive 
procedures (e.g. fixed capacity payments 
administratively defined should not be taken into 
account). 
According to Regulation (EC) no. 714/2009, 
Transmission System Operators (TSOs) are in charge 
of assessing the present and future adequacy of the 
power system both at the national level and, through 
the European Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), at the European 
level. In doing so, TSOs should not only ‘passively’ 
try to envisage future generation development 
according to market player investment behaviour. 
They should support the implementation of adequacy 
instruments by being ‘proactive’ and providing a 
technical evaluation of how much new generation 
capacity of each type is needed, and when and where 
it is needed (as the location in the network is very 
important). This can be done on the basis of scenario 
analyses, especially of demand evolution, intermittent 
renewable sources penetration and network 
development. Ideally, this entire process would be 
coordinated and harmonised at the EU level to 
increase effectiveness and avoid market distortions. 
However, even a generation set that is adequate in 
terms of installed capacity and composition can 
become insecure again if its fuel mix is not 
sufficiently diversified: a large amount of capacity 
could become unavailable in the case of a fuel supply 
shortage. 
Several remedies for fuel supply shortages exist. In 
the context of the power system, the most obvious 
policy remedy is the long-term pursuit of greater 
primary source diversification in the generation set. In 
this respect, increased emphasis on sustainable 
development of renewable energy sources (RES), 
supported by Directive 2009/28/EC, is a must for 
several reasons, not least among them security of 
supply. Nevertheless, as indicated above, the 
intermittent nature of RES requires an adequate 
backup capacity comprised of conventional 
dispatchable power plants. In fact, greater primary 
source diversification could be achieved using the 
same regulatory instruments concerning capacity 
adequacy mentioned above. Of course, the highest 
political levels responsible for the overall energy 
policy are in charge of the quantitative definition of 
the objective itself: in this case TSOs could only play 
the role of consultants for technical aspects 
concerning the implementation of the objective and its 
impact on system adequacy. 
Effective remedies for a fuel supply shortage can also 
be put in place outside the power system. SECURE 
project studies found that the best insurance for all gas 
consumers is a significant amount of gas storage, both 
for modulation and, especially, strategic purposes. 
The development of an adequate amount of gas 
storage infrastructure, both at the European level and, 
especially, in countries where natural gas accounts for 
a large share of primary energy consumption, should 
have a high priority in overall energy policy. 
Diversification can also be applied as a fuel shortage 
remedy to both suppliers and supply infrastructure: 
diversifying the former reduces counterpart risk, 
while diversifying the latter reduces accident-related 
risk and the risk of shortages caused by transit 
countries. As for natural gas, LNG terminals are the 
most flexible way to implement diversification, since 
their supply is tied neither to a single supplier nor to a 
single pipeline. New energy supply infrastructure at 
the European level should be prioritised according to 
its diversification capability. 
Finally, increasing cross-border transmission capacity 
can help foreign power systems better assist the 
countries affected by shortages. This is the next link 
in the electricity supply chain. 
2.  Transmission: Investing in new 
interconnections, dealing with 
uncertainty 
The SECURE project assessed the impact of non-
optimal development of European cross-border 
transmission capacity. Needless to say, the main 
remedy to such non-optimal development is to invest 
in new interconnections. The resulting reduction of 
bottlenecks will make it easier to transport cheaper 
energy to where it is needed and increase security of 
supply, but also allow for greater integration and more 
efficient operation (as a result of a reduction of local Europe’s Electricity Supply Security | 3 
market power) of the internal electricity market and, 
in the end, for a more optimised operation of the 
generation set, with significant economic benefits. 
This remedy is of course not so easy to implement, 
neither by TSOs nor by private investors interested in 
merchant line projects. In fact, such investments are 
typically affected by several uncertainties,
1 mainly 
due to: 
•  complex legal and regulatory contexts, 
especially for permitting procedures, 
stemming from a multitude of authorities at 
different administrative levels (European, 
national, local), which may differ from one 
country to another and have different 
priorities; 
•  the lack of social acceptance that severely 
delays or jeopardises the realisation of such 
projects; 
•  the long-term time horizon that characterises 
network projects; and 
•  the inherent difficulty of predicting the future 
location, amount and type of generation and 
load. 
To reduce such uncertainties,
2 several actions are 
necessary. The establishment of the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators, or ACER, 
foreseen by the EU legislative proposals collectively 
known as the Third Energy Package, should be a 
significant step towards a more harmonised regulatory 
framework at the European level. As for permitting 
procedures, it is necessary
3 to act on the legal 
framework, first by simplifying and rationalising the 
procedures (reduce the number of entities and phases 
involved, etc.); for strategic infrastructure projects, 
the procedures should be centralised at one (national) 
level, while upgrading existing lines should require 
simplified procedures with a shorter duration. Next, 
set reasonable maximum time limits for the 
completion of procedures; harmonise the procedures 
and criteria for authorisation at the EU level through 
binding guidelines; and secure early binding pre-
approval of the projects as reported in TSO 
development plans in order to avoid TSOs spending 
                                                 
1 As a general remark, one of the main barriers to long-term 
energy sector investments (which are usually quite capital 
intensive) is regulatory and legal uncertainty: it is crucial to 
guarantee investors by establishing some basic key 
conditions under which they will have to operate, in order 
to let them correctly assess their risks. 
2 Some of the following policy recommendations are 
discussed in more detail within the EC REALISEGRID 
project coordinated by RSE. 
3 Additional detailed recommendations are reported in 
“ENTSO-E position paper on permitting procedures for 
electricity transmission infrastructures”, 29 June 2010. 
time justifying the need for the projects during 
permitting procedures. Once these steps on the legal 
framework are taken, an ‘arbiter’ or ‘facilitator’ (e.g. 
ACER) can be designated to promote compromises, 
deal with controversies and speed up the realisation of 
strategic projects in transnational cases. 
As for the lack of social acceptance, it is necessary to 
provide a clear and objective vision of the benefits 
and costs of the new infrastructure, to prioritise 
investments worthy of EU funding, and to clearly 
state the cost to society of inaction or suboptimal 
actions. The relationship between RES integration, 
security of supply and grid development, and the 
relationship between costs and technical solutions 
(e.g. overhead lines vs. underground cables), must be 
clarified. To facilitate informed appraisal of project 
‘pros’ and ‘cons’, independent and competent bodies 
can help initiate a clear, sound, scientific discussion of 
all key issues related to the public perception of a new 
transmission line (negative impacts on human health, 
landscape, property value, noise, migratory paths, 
etc.; feelings such as “burden to me, benefits to 
others”, “home invasion”, “lack of democracy”, lack 
of “serious” information, etc.). A thorough evaluation 
of property value must be promoted to guarantee fair 
compensation (including “immaterial” aspects) agreed 
to by all the parties. It is very important to find 
consensus among the involved populations on the 
economic side of the problem: they must know that 
the realisation of the projects will reduce their 
electricity bills (either by imports of cheaper energy 
or by direct compensation). Otherwise, the NIMBY 
attitude is their first and easiest recourse. 
Uncertainties concerning the future of generation and 
demand can be effectively tackled by carrying out 
adequate scenario analyses similar to those in the 
SECURE project, based on POLES (Prospective 
Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems) model 
scenarios. This approach is also supported by 
ENTSO-E, which states, “[S]cenario analyses at 
national, regional and pan-European levels are key 
elements in order to decide on grid extensions and to 
adequately assist political reasoning”, taking into 
account “fuel prices, economic and monetary 
conditions, geopolitical developments, meteorological 
conditions, technological breakthroughs, market 
mechanisms, regulatory and legal frameworks”. 
Moreover, generation companies should be 
discouraged (with economic penalties) from initiating 
permitting procedures if they are not strongly 
committed to realising the investments. Finally, the 
use of appropriate technology solutions (e.g. a flexible 
alternating current transmission system, or FACTS) 
can increase the transmission capacity of existing 
infrastructure, thus avoiding the need for investments 
in new lines. These faster and less expensive solutions 4 | Michele Benini 
must be adequately encouraged and remunerated by 
regulation. 
Up to this point we have discussed the problems 
related to each generic development of the European 
cross-border transmission network (and most of the 
above mentioned issues are relevant to expansions of 
national transmission networks, too), but it is very 
important to end up with an optimal set of 
developments, according to the considered reference 
scenarios. Again, this is exactly what has been done in 
the SECURE project, following an approach 
supported by ENTSO-E, which in its recent “Research 
and Development Plan” endorses the development of 
“Advanced tools for analyzing the pan-European 
network expansion options according to energy 
scenarios for Europe (i.e. expansion optima that must 
be searched to maximize European welfare)”, 
specifying that optima are to be searched at the EU 
level and no longer only at the national level. 
As it is desirable to harmonise generation and 
transmission development, regulation must foresee the 
provision of ‘locational signals’, i.e. the spatial 
(zonal/nodal) differentiation of electricity prices (due 
to maximum transfer capability constraints and losses 
on the lines) and of transmission charges (calculated 
on the basis of how much each agent uses the 
network). Locational signals can therefore provide 
adequate economic incentives to market players about 
the dependency of energy supply costs on the physical 
location of production/consumption facilities, thereby 
leading to more efficient system operation in the short 
term and promoting a more optimised siting of new 
generators and loads in the long term. Moreover, as 
mentioned above, consumers who are exposed to 
locational electricity prices may directly benefit, e.g. 
from price reductions due to the installation of a new 
nearby power plant or transmission line,
4 and thus 
receive incentives not to assume an a priori NIMBY 
attitude. 
3. Distribution:  distributed generation 
and ‘smartness’ 
The main challenge to distribution is its progressive 
transformation from a “passive” to an “active” 
network, due to the increased penetration of 
distributed generation. In this respect, Directive 
2009/72/EC states that “Member States should 
encourage the modernisation of distribution networks, 
such as through the introduction of smart grids, which 
should be built in a way that encourages decentralised 
generation and energy efficiency”. 
                                                 
4 Nevertheless, it must be taken into account that increasing 
transmission capacity along a congested path reduces prices 
in the importing area, but increases them in the exporting 
area. 
Generally speaking, current distribution networks 
have some margins to host a limited amount of 
distributed generation, but, over a certain level, the 
quality and reliability of service can no longer be 
guaranteed, so additional measures, ranging from 
simple changes in protection or control settings to 
massive network investments, are needed. Therefore, 
development and deployment of new communication 
and control technologies is the key to making 
distribution grids “smarter”, i.e. able to “cost 
efficiently integrate the behaviour and actions of all 
users connected to it – generators, consumers and 
those that do both – in order to ensure economically 
efficient, sustainable power system with low losses 
and high levels of quality and security of supply and 
safety”, as stated in the “Position paper on smart 
grids” by ERGEG (European Regulators’ Group for 
Electricity and Gas). 
From the technological point of view, cooperation 
among international, European and national 
standardisation bodies, regulatory authorities, grid 
operators and manufacturers should be encouraged to 
further improve open communication protocols and 
standards for information management and data 
exchange, and achieve interoperability of smart grid 
devices and systems so as to avoid any technical 
barrier to their deployment. 
From a regulatory point of view, a key question is 
how to support distribution network companies in 
their investments in such innovative technologies, in 
order to ensure that their deployment provides a cost-
effective solution to the needs of network users. To 
this end, we share ERGEG’s view that regulators 
must not attempt to choose or impose specific 
solutions – they must remain technologically neutral – 
leaving network companies to manage their business 
(which they have ultimate control over) in the most 
appropriate way: regulation should focus on the 
benefits for network users and not on the technical 
details to get them. Therefore, regulatory schemes for 
promoting improvements in performance of electricity 
distribution networks require the quantification, 
through appropriate indicators, of the effects and 
benefits of such investments in “smartness”.  
The definition of performance targets and indicators 
should be accompanied by clear, transparent and 
objective measurement rules that make it possible to 
observe, quantify and verify such targets. Moreover, 
performance targets should be benchmarked to define 
their expected values and should be strictly related to 
the pursued objectives: they should therefore be 
cleansed of external effects outside the control of 
network operators. Then, having defined targets and 
indicators, it is possible to use either incentive 
regulation, where regulated entities are either 
rewarded if they overperform or penalised if they 
underperform; minimum requirements regulation, Europe’s Electricity Supply Security | 5 
where a minimum performance level must be 
accomplished by the regulated entity; or a 
combination of both. In the above mentioned ERGEG 
position paper a set of indicators is proposed. 
4.  Demand: Demand response 
techniques and energy efficiency 
The last (but not least) link in the chain is demand. 
The two main issues related to security of supply are 
“demand response” and “energy efficiency”. Demand 
response is related to the capability of consumers to 
respond to price signals or to signals concerning the 
criticality of system operation with a variation of their 
consumption profiles. Demand response’s main 
beneficial effect is to reduce demand in peak 
load/high price periods, possibly moving part of it to 
less critical/lower price hours. A lower peak load: 
•  increases reserve margin (thus increasing 
security of supply) and, in the longer term, 
reduces the need for investments in new 
generation capacity; 
•  reduces the stress (and possible congestion) 
on both transmission and distribution 
networks, delaying the need for network 
expansions; 
•  reduces the necessity of dispatching costly 
and low efficiency power plants during peak 
hours, thus also reducing fuel consumption 
and CO2 emissions; 
•  reduces both the possibility of exercising 
market power by producers and price 
volatility, by making demand more elastic to 
price. 
In fact, electricity demand has always been quite 
inelastic and an increase of its flexibility requires: 
•  a way to communicate the price/criticality 
signals to consumers; 
•  signal strength (or rewards for responding) 
significant enough to convince consumers to 
respond; and 
•  the genuine possibility for consumers to 
respond to the signals, according to their way 
of life and to the electric devices they manage 
manually and/or automatically. 
The communication requirements and the necessity to 
measure and record the amount and the time of the 
response entail the availability of ‘smart meters’, 
which is also endorsed by Directive 2009/72/EC. It 
states that given a positive economic assessment of 
their long-term costs and benefits, at least 80% of 
consumers shall be equipped with intelligent metering 
systems by 2020. Such timing does not seem very 
ambitious taking into account best practices in 
countries such as Italy. Again, signal strength is 
critical to the success of demand response 
programmes: simple peak/off-peak tariffs with limited 
price differences that allow consumers to save mere 
tenths of a euro per year will not have any significant 
success. Moreover, the signals must be simple and 
easily understandable by consumers, so that they can 
correctly respond to them. Finally, provided that the 
proper communication and metering devices are in 
place and that there is substantial economic 
convenience to participate in demand response 
programs, information campaigns are necessary to 
enrol as many consumers as possible. 
Regarding ‘energy efficiency’, EU energy policy 
foresees its implementation as an important means to 
reach the mandatory targets concerning CO2 
emissions reduction and RES development (whose 
objective is proportional to gross final consumption). 
To this end, several European directives (such as 
Directive 2006/32/EC of 5 April 2006 on energy end-
use efficiency and energy services, Directive 
2009/125/EC of 21 October 2009 establishing a 
framework for the setting of ecodesign requirements 
for energy-related products, Directive 2010/30/EU of 
19 May 2010 on the indication by labelling and 
standard product information of the consumption of 
energy and other resources by energy-related 
products, Directive 2010/31/EU of 19 May 2010 on 
the energy performance of buildings, etc.) and 
national laws and regulations (such as the National 
Energy Efficiency Action Plans) have been passed 
and are being implemented. 
Generally speaking, it is clear that lower energy 
consumption reduces stress on the whole supply 
chain, thereby increasing security of supply. 
Moreover, most of the actions that can be carried out 
to increase energy efficiency have a ‘negative’ cost, 
i.e. they pay for themselves, therefore they are more 
economically efficient than actions to support RES 
development and reduce CO2 emissions (such as 
Carbon Capture and Storage technologies). 
Nevertheless, some promotion is necessary, typically 
with fiscal incentives together with obligation 
schemes, such as White Certificates, and minimum 
standard requirements, in order to overcome possible 
barriers, such as the financial capability of customers 
to invest in more efficient appliances, the impact on 
their way of life of the implementation of such 
actions, the short-term view of some industrial 
management, that would avoid reducing the profits of 
the current financial year (by investing in more 
efficient technologies), in exchange for future lower 
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